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35 
Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions  
M. Cherif Bassiouni* 
Shakespeare wrote that a rose by any other name is still a rose. 
But in the United Nations (UN), a fact-finding mission, 
notwithstanding its name, is not necessarily a fact-finding mission.1  
The UN is a political organization consisting of several organs, 
bodies, and agencies that deal with different matters; exercise varying 
levels of authority and prerogatives; fulfill different or subordinate 
functions; operate with somewhat different methods; and—with the 
exception of the UN organs and bodies, the UN agencies, and treaty-
bodies—have their own budgets.2 All of them are process-driven, 
subject to the United Nations Charter (Charter) and the rules the 
different organizations may adopt. They rigidly observe the principle 
of coequal sovereignty from which flows the all important internal 
procedural rule of equitable geographic representation. What they 
have most in common, other than the political characteristics 
mentioned above, is the system’s bureaucracy.  
The UN system resembles a spaghetti bowl in which some 
 
 * Professor of Law; President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul 
University; President, International Association of Penal Law; President, International Institute 
of Higher Studies in Criminal Studies; Chairman, United Nations Security Council Commission 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia. 
 1. With respect to human rights fact-finding, see HANS THOOLEN & B. VERSTAPPEN, 
HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS: A STUDY OF THE FACT-FINDING PRACTICE OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1987); Thomas M. Franck & H. Scott Fairley, Procedural 
Due Process in Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 308 
(1980); David Weissbrodt & James McCarthy, Fact-Finding by International Human Rights 
Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981). 
 2. A critical observation whose implication goes far beyond what it appears is the resort 
by the United Nations to state-funding through voluntary trust funds and direct funding of 
projects, as well as indirect funding through NGOs and state-contributed personnel. These 
different funding techniques frequently become the tail that wags the dog in that they determine 
policies and priorities, but may have conflicting or counter-productive characteristics. Mostly, 
however, they are unnecessarily competitive, searching for public and media recognition, short-
term, and limited in scope. The foregoing adds up to ad hoc practices that produce haphazard 
and limited results while giving the appearance of a significant contribution to the overall goals 
of justice-related fact-finding missions. 
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spaghetti may be long on mandate but thin on substance, while other 
may be short on mandate and thick on substance, with everything else 
somewhere in between. Some commentators attribute this condition 
to the nature of the beast; others blame it on the bureaucracy; and still 
others conclude that when you seek a synthesis of the diversities 
inherent in the world’s governmental systems, you are likely to get 
the worst along with the best, though the latter is less frequent. To 
paraphrase Charles Dickens, it is, at once, the best of all things and 
the worst of all things.3 
Whatever the diagnosis, and notwithstanding chronic symptoms 
of institutional and bureaucratic problems, some components of the 
system have on occasion accomplished extraordinary results, and 
others have made significant strides. The worst rightfully can be 
blamed on the political motive of the organization, its bureaucracy, 
management processes, and lack of resources due essentially to 
unpaid U.S. dues and assessments. Yet it is concerned governments 
and dedicated staffers that make up the best of what the UN system 
offers. As is frequently said, if the UN did not exist, we would need 
to invent it. But it can be improved, particularly when it comes to 
justice-related fact-finding missions. 
The United Nations is a vast organization whose multiple 
processes bring about fact-finding missions.4 Some of these processes 
 
 3. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES (Norman Paige ed., Charles E. Tuttle 
1994) (1859). 
 4. As stated by this writer:  
  The range and extent of violations of internationally and regionally protected 
human rights vary extensively. They may occur either on a sporadic individual basis or 
they may be more widespread. In some instances, they are the product of deliberate 
state policy and conducted with some degree of openness by agents of the state. In 
other instances they are condoned by state policy or its practices. Most of the time they 
appear to be spurred by the "abuse of power" of public officials which are carried out 
in a concealed or secret fashion as in the case of torture. 
  Experience indicates that whenever public opinion, both national and 
international, focuses on these policies and practices, enough pressure is brought to 
bear on governments to cause the cessation, or at least the significant reduction in the 
number of these violations or their intensity. 
  International and regional organizations do not have the machinery, personnel, 
and resources needed to monitor all suspected, reported or known incidences of such 
violations. Furthermore the deeply entrenched concepts of sovereignty and acute 
senses of national pride have only grudgingly permitted international intervention in 
the internal legal order. Even so, however, direct international intervention without the 
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are established by norms; others by custom and practice, but many of 
the processes are ad hoc. The courses of these processes are not 
always linear, consistent, or predictable, and frequently they will take 
unexpected turns. Scholars, observers, and UN staffers provide 
explanations that frequently rationalize such unforeseen and 
sometimes unexplainable turns in order to preserve the system’s 
appearance of legitimacy, even if it comes at the cost of truth and 
other fundamental values. These explanations provide a leitmotif of 
variations on the theme of Marbury v. Madison,5 whereby the critique 
is exercised on the implicit condition of legitimizing or rationalizing 
the processes’ departure from the established or expected course.  
Because the UN system is process-driven, not, to say, process-
oriented, concentration is drawn to the processes while attention is 
deflected from their substantive outcomes. Indeed, the time-honored, 
though not always honorable, technique of substituting processes for 
outcomes and of using processes to generate outcomes contrary to 
those expected has been perfected within the UN system. This 
characteristic hinders substantive accountability. With respect to 
justice-related fact-finding missions, the contrast, and at times the 
conflict, between realpolitik and the values of justice is frequently at 
issue.  
The UN was established as a political organization, and, as such, 
it is largely governed by political considerations. Unlike individuals 
who may be motivated by enduring values, governments are 
motivated by shifting interests. The political nature of the 
organization is evidenced by the allocation of prerogatives to the 
General Assembly and the Security Council. More particularly, it 
 
consent of the affected state is not yet of international reality. Thus there are no 
established international or regional mechanisms for the identification and appraisal of 
human rights violations except for some modalities and procedures which permit 
complaints to reach certain international and regional bodies which can, in varying 
degrees of legal authority, hear, consider, or adjudicate these complaints. These 
structures vary. Within the United Nations there is no adjucative system, only some 
opportunities for presentation of complaints by states or individuals and eventual 
finding by means of reports or resolutions are the outcome. The legal authority, 
competence, procedures, and processes of these structures differ. 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights Mission: A Study of the Fact-Finding Practice of Non-
Governmental Organizations, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 469, 469-70 (1989) (book review). 
 5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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explains why the Security Council is unbridled in its determination of 
peace and security issues. These considerations are elevated above 
judicial or other forms of review, although always subject to self-
review whenever considerations of power and interest require it. 
The human rights component of the UN system reflects the values 
of justice, while systemically it functions as a political process, thus 
conditioning the upholding of these values to political oversight. In 
past decades, what Secretary-General Kofi Annan frequently refers to 
as the “international civil society” compelled realpolitik to take into 
account the values of justice. It is not for the sake of these values but 
rather to offer persons pursuing political ends utility in the form of 
conflict management and conflict settlement. Seen from this 
perspective, justice becomes another card for the realpolitician to 
play and eventually barter away, in a mostly hidden manner, when in 
pursuit of achieving a political goal. This reality, more than anything 
else, impacts upon the effectiveness and impartiality of fact-finding 
missions. 
Assessing the establishment, methods, goals, and outcomes, fact-
finding missions—which includes investigations of situations 
requiring the determination, albeit relative, of truth and justice—must 
take into account the above-described context. Thus, the 
establishment, methods, and goals of fact-finding missions depend 
essentially on the following factors:  
1. the organ, body, or agency that establishes it and 
determines its subject matter, scope, and political authority 
and influence over the bureaucracy; 
2. the mandate given to it, which determines the scope of the 
mission and its duration, as well as its political authority; 
and6  
3. the degree of political support from the permanent five 
members and, more particularly, from the three Western 
ones, which determines its real authority and effectiveness.  
While these factors are not necessarily present in all cases and 
 
 6. This factor will depend on whether the mandate is politically intended to be carried 
out as enunciated or not. Sometimes what appears is not what is contemplated. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/6
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certainly vary in degree and mixture with respect to each mission, 
they are determinative of the outcome of these missions. 
Because the values of truth and justice have become part of the 
tools of realpolitik, nothing can be done to overtly contradict these 
values. Consequently, less than obvious ways must be devised to 
ensure that these missions will, when politically convenient, give 
only the appearance of pursuing these values while at the same time 
not generating politically unwanted results. This is essentially, but 
not exclusively, accomplished in three ways:  
1. appointing compliant and understanding non-UN staff 
persons as heads and members of these missions;  
2. relying on a politically-sensitized and cooperative staff; and 
3. using the financial resources and bureaucracy to guide the 
work and outcomes of these missions. 
These factors are interrelated in that the heads and other 
appointees to these missions are politically determined; the 
bureaucracy has a large influence in the making of these choices; the 
bureaucracy needs to please the influential member-states because 
they determine budgets and impact on promotions and staff 
assignments; appointees are rewarded by the bureaucracy for 
compliance with their guidance through greater cooperation, which is 
necessary for the success of the given mission; and present 
appointees receive support from the bureaucracy for prospective 
appointments. This explains in part why there is such a recurrence of 
the same appointees to these missions and why certain members are 
assigned to work and guide them. The latter factor may also be 
positive, in that the selection of recurring staff to support these 
missions provides for more experience and expertise, thereby 
contributing to the success of the mission. 
There is one last significant factor. UN appointments to such 
missions are lucrative by most national standards, particularly when 
they are likely to be short-term and thus supplemental of the income 
of the appointees. For many appointees to these missions, this is 
something worth pursuing, and many governments are anxious to 
provide these positions to some of their nationals as rewards for their 
services. Consequently, governments insist on equitable geographic 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and political representation in respect to all UN appointments. 
Because of the political nature of the organization, this criterion is 
more important than competence, specific expertise, and 
appropriateness of choice. As a result, the level of expertise that 
heads and other appointees bring to these missions varies 
significantly and often depends on the expertise and efficiency of the 
UN staff. It is also significant that UN staff appointments are likewise 
made on the basis of equitable geographic representation. For this 
reason, member-states are reluctant to accept voluntary contributions 
of personnel that do not respect the balance of equitable geographic 
representation. But what this rule ignores is that all member-states do 
not have the capability of contributing personnel with the expertise 
required for these missions. 
Within the human rights arena, there is an almost incestuous 
tendency to reappoint the same experts to the missions and the same 
UN staffers to support them. More frequently than not, the reports 
produced are designed to please the influential Geneva-based non-
governmental organization (NGO) community and certain 
governments, particularly the three Western permanent members and 
a number of Western European countries that champion human 
rights. Consequently, other states feel less influential in the process, 
and, at times, they even feel targeted by the process and its outcomes. 
One need not look for hidden conspiracies to explain certain 
strained or unexplainable outcomes; rather, they can be explained by 
the political dynamics of a system that is fueled by political 
considerations, personal ambition, venality, and other human frailties. 
The foregoing also explains why certain efficacy measures that 
would greatly enhance the accomplishment of these missions are not 
put in place. If they were, they would help clarify what is at times 
intended to be murky. One example is illustrative of this regrettable 
situation. After fifty years, there is no standard operating procedure 
for fact-finding missions. Admittedly, any standard operating 
procedure needs to be tailored to the situation. But no manual exists 
to describe how an investigation should be conducted and there is no 
standard, though adaptable, computer program to input collected 
data. Worst of all, there is no continuity. In short, there is nothing to 
guide, instruct, or assist the heads and appointees to these missions of 
how to better carry out their mandates. It strains one’s belief that in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/6
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fifty years the most elementary aspects of standardized organization, 
planning, documentation, and reporting have not been developed. 
Thus, each mission has to reinvent the wheel and, in an 
organizational sense, has to reinvent itself as a mission. The results 
are usually poor or mediocre performance, except where particularly 
competent persons are appointed to these missions, and in these rare 
cases it is their entrepreneurial and other qualities that bring about the 
mission’s success. But the contributions of dedicated and hard-
working UN staffers should not be overlooked in assessing the 
success of these missions. This situation also means that there is little 
consistency and predictability as to the methods and outcomes. Thus, 
there is no way of comparing the results of different, though 
substantively similar, missions. This principle applies equally well to 
ongoing missions that produce multiple reports, where it is at times 
difficult to compare working methods pursued during the mission and 
the results they produce. 
 The lack of standardized methods, particularly as to empirical 
research and field investigation, means that there is no basis to test 
the validity of the research in order to assess the plausibility of the 
conclusions. It is safe to say that no scientific research methodology 
would consider the above-described approach as anything but 
selective, insufficient, unreliable, and, at best, anecdotal. It should 
also be noted that portions of mandates issued by UN organs, bodies, 
and agencies are at times overlapping and almost always ad hoc. 
Among the results of these partially overlapping mandates are: 
1. confusion as to the boundaries of the overlapping
 mandates; 
2. potential contradictions in the conclusions; and  
3. potential mutual reliance of these missions in reporting on 
the overlapping areas, thus creating a false impression of 
confirmation and reliability. 
 As a result of the ad hoc issuance of these mandates:  
1. there is no predictability as to the situations that will 
warrant issuance of such mandates;  
2. the decisions to issue, extend, amend and terminate these 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mandates seem essentially contingent upon political and 
extraneous circumstances; and  
3. there is infrequent continuity in follow-up on missions that 
have reached the end of the mandates. 
These observations are evident in the workings of mandates issued 
by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Commission on 
Human Rights, the Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and the Treaty-bodies. 
Each one of these appointing organs or bodies relies on a separate 
formula, uses a different label, provides for different operational 
methods, and offers different levels of support and resources. 
However, they have common powers: to establish and terminate the 
mandate; to define its scope and duration; to appoint its heads and 
other members; and to determine or condition its operational 
capabilities. 
The Commission on Human Rights has rapporteurs and 
independent experts; the Subcommission has special rapporteurs; the 
Security Council has Commissions, and the Secretary-General has 
Personal Representatives. Most of the Commission and 
Subcommission fact-finding missions have limited resources, 
sometimes none at all, and are supported by one or, at best, two 
staffers, mostly on a part-time basis. These missions seldom have the 
resources or the ability to do effective field work or empirical 
research. Consequently, they rely heavily on the NGOs, government 
reports, and the media. Many rapporteurs, or whatever their actual 
designation may be, produce reports even though they never set foot 
in the territory where their investigation takes place. Thus, the experts 
who over the years had to investigate human rights violations in 
South Africa during the apartheid regime, Iran, Iraq, and Israel were 
not allowed into these countries, yet they still reported on them.  
The Security Council may establish a Commission because it sees 
the need, at that time, for that issue to go through a particular process. 
The Rwanda Commission was one such case,7 whose mandate and 
duration were limited. It lasted three months and made a single one-
 
 7. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 
(1994). 
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week visit to Rwanda. Its function was essentially window dressing. 
At the time, the Security Council wanted to follow its precedent of 
the Yugoslavia Commission8 that preceded the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)9 and that called for its 
establishment as stated in Resolution 808.10 Thus, it seemed to the 
Security Council more suitable, before establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),11 to have a commission that 
would call for it. But there was another reason: It was necessary to 
gain time before the Security Council established the ICTR in order 
to work out the logistics of the prospective tribunal.  
Regrettably, the ICTR’s beginnings were fraught with 
mismanagement and minor corruption. Because of the “closed 
society” mentality of the UN system and its aversion to admit error, 
the cover-up lasted for almost two years, until the Inspector General 
produced a scathing report.12  
While the Yugoslavia Commission model, which preceded the 
establishment of the ICTY, was deemed procedurally to be the 
appropriate one, the substantive work that it did in two years was not 
deemed desirable for the Rwanda Commission, principally because 
of the UN’s failure to act to prevent genocide there.13 That failure to 
act was not based on ignorance of the facts, as Secretary-General 
Annan’s subsequent report on Rwanda admitted.14 Instead, it was the 
 
 8. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992). 
 9. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), annexed to Report of 
the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993). 
 10. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) 
[hereinafter Res. 808]. 
 11. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
 12. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Audit and Investigation of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (1997). 
 13. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 147-71 (1998); GIRARD PRUNIER, THE 
RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 276-80 (1995); JosJ E. Alvarez, Crimes of 
State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 390-91 (1999). 
 14. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda (Dec. 15, 1999), at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_ 
report.htm (last visited Apr., 2000). 
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system’s failure in the face of the Clinton Administration’s decision 
against military action. Legal and moral responsibility in this case 
clearly falls on the Clinton Administration, but the question troubled 
the Secretary-General enough to issue a report accepting part of the 
moral responsibility.15 Considering that the UN was imperiled by the 
United States’ nonpayment of arrears in dues and its hopeful 
expectations that the United States will meet its obligations at some 
time, it would not have been politically advisable to have a 
commission of independent experts investigating that tragedy, to 
evidence how it happened and who stood in the way of preventing the 
genocide’s occurrence. But in this case, the United States was not the 
only state needing a cover-up. France also needed one, as it had 
armed and trained the Hutus in Rwanda, and some of the French 
military advisers reportedly were in place while the genocide 
occurred. Subsequently, France sent a military force to protect the 
Hutus retreat against advancing Tutsis.  
Thus, the Rwanda Commission had to be limited in scope and 
duration, and its members could not be activists who would pursue 
truth. The final report was essentially drafted by the UN staff and did 
not allude to any of these facts. The Rwanda Commission did not do 
any fact-finding though it was deemed of a fact-finding nature.  
The Security Council also established a Commission for the Great 
Lakes region which went to the Congo, was shunned by President 
Lawrence Kabila’s protests and, after a period of waiting, was 
recalled by the Secretary-General, never to be heard of again.16 The 
Cambodia Commission produced a brief report that, due to the 
expertise of one of its members, proved useful.17 However, its 
recommendations were not followed. The formula for the so-called 
“tribunal” for the crimes committed in that country is yet to see the 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. GOUREVITCH, supra note 13, at 332-36. 
 17. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 52/135 (Feb. 18, 1999), annexed to Letters from the Secretary-General, to 
the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (Mar. 15, 
1999), 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Docs. A/53/850 and S/1999/231 (1999). That 
member was Professor Steve Ratner. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997). 
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light of day. Another instance was that of East Timor.18 So far no 
significant fact-finding report has been published, probably because 
none was actually undertaken.19 
Fact-finding missions also come in other high-level processes. 
The Secretary-General may appoint a Personal Representative to 
undertake such a mission, as does the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights and the High Commissioner on Refugees. These High 
Commissioners may themselves go out on such missions.20 But these 
missions are not real fact-finding missions. They are political 
missions that need a more neutral or acceptable label to pursue what 
is essentially a laudable effort to reduce tensions, cause violence to 
abate, or help restore and preserve peace. Sometimes they are 
designed to simply show responsiveness to public outcry in certain 
egregious situations. In these cases they are more akin to public-
relations missions.21 
Fact-finding and investigation are a means to an end. With respect 
to the values of truth and justice, the end is accountability of the 
perpetrators, particularly the leaders of jus cogens crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, slavery and 
slave-related practices, and apartheid.22 But accountability has yet to 
be clearly established as one of the goals of fact-finding missions. 
 
 18. United Nations Inquiry into Possible Human Rights Violations in East Timor Sought 
by Economic and Social Council, Press Release ECOSOC/5879 (Nov. 15, 1999) (“The 
Economic and Social Council endorsed the call for the Secretary-General to establish an 
international commission of inquiry to gather information on possible human rights violations 
in East Timor . . . .”). Cf. GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE TRIAL OF POL POT 
AND LENG SARY (Howard J. De Nike et al. eds., 2000); POL POT PLANS THE FUTURE: 
CONFIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP DOCUMENTS FROM DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, 1976-1977 (David 
P. Chander et al. eds. & trans., 1988); THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA: 1991-1995 
(1995).  
 19. The goal in East Timor was to stop the violence and then transition that region into 
independence from Indonesia. See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg. at 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) (establishing United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor). 
 20. High Commissioner Mary Robinson went to Chechnya from March through April, 
2000 on a designated "fact-finding mission" and presented her report to the Commission on 
Human Rights on April 5, 2000. 
 21. This was the case when the High Commissioner for Human Rights sent an expert, 
then a few UN staffers to Kosovo in 1999. 
 22. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for International Accountability, in 3 INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
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Indeed, to date the UN has not promulgated guidelines for 
accountability.23 
Probably the most significant fact-finding operation in UN history 
was the work of the Commission established by the Security Council 
pursuant to Resolution 780 in 1992 to investigate war crimes in the 
Former Yugoslavia.24 The Commission worked for two years, during 
which it conducted thirty-five field investigations, established the 
most extensive database for gathering evidence and information 
about violations of international humanitarian law, identified over 
800 places of detention, estimated 50,000 cases of torture and 
200,000 deaths, estimated two million displaced persons as a result of 
ethnic cleansing that was documented in connection with some 2,000 
towns and villages where the practices took place, and conducted the 
world’s first and most extensive investigation into systematic rape. 
The latter produced over 500 affidavits of victims who identified 
their perpetrators. Interviews were conducted with 223 victims and 
witnesses; gathered information led to the identification of close to 
1,500 cases; and other information revealed the possibility of an 
additional 4,500 or so victims.25 
Most significantly, the Commission, which received from the 
Security Council the broadest mandate since the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, received no funding 
from the UN to conduct its investigations. The funding had to be 
raised from states’ voluntary contributions, states’ contributed 
personnel, private sources of funding, and ultimately the support of 
DePaul University, which gave this author the space, overhead costs, 
and staff to establish the database in Chicago. Over a period of two 
years, over 140 lawyers and law students worked at the database that 
produced close to 80,000 documents and 300 hours of videotapes. It 
was on that basis that the Commission was able to produce its Final 
 
 23. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for 
Accountablity, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1996), reprinted in 14 NOUVELLES ITUDES 
PENALES 45-78 (1998). 
 24. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994). 
 25. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the 
Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 279 (1994). 
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Report and Annexes. The report exceeded 3,300 pages and was the 
longest report made by the Security Council. The history of the 
Commission was tormented and difficult, as it faced opposition by 
some governments and those in the UN bureaucracy who wanted to 
advance the political agendas of those governments. That explains the 
lack of resources that the UN allocated for the investigation, though it 
did provide the costs of some staff and some limited space at the UN 
Headquarters in Geneva.26  
Ultimately, however, it was the Commission’s work that gave the 
Security Council the basis to establish the ICTY.27 The politics of 
justice continued in the Security Council’s selection of the ICTY 
prosecutor.28 It was also reflected in the early administrative 
termination of the Commission, even though the Security Council 
never adopted a resolution to that effect.29 Nevertheless, if it had not 
been for the work of the Commission, the ICTY Prosecutor who took 
office almost fourteen months after the establishment of the Tribunal 
would not have been able to start his work as fast and as efficiently. 
The Commission’s task was enormous. A war was going on; there 
was no precedent to guide its work; it had almost no resources 
available, and it lacked the political backing or the political will of a 
unified Security Council to which the UN bureaucracy is responsible. 
More importantly, at the time, the world was emerging from almost a 
half-century of the Cold War, punctured by many regional and 
internal conflicts of different dimensions and scope. The idea of 
impartial, effective, politically independent, and fair international 
criminal justice was not even on the radar screen of most 
governments. In a sense, there was a psychological iron curtain that 
prevented even the consideration of such a system of international 
criminal justice. The Commission’s work tore down this 
psychological iron curtain. Since then, international criminal justice 
has become part of the values of the international community, though 
it is still confronted by the exigencies of realpolitik.30 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Res. 808, supra note 10, pmbl. 
 28. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 210-12 (1996). 
 29. Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 336-38. 
 30. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. 
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On a more practical level, extraordinarily, the UN has not yet 
developed a system, despite the experience of the Commission and 
what followed in the area of fact-finding. Thus, every new 
Commission, fact-finding body, or mandate for individual fact-
finding is ad hoc. There is no institutional memory, and there is no 
system by which the experiences of the past can be used to benefit 
the future. It is beyond logical explanation to find that the UN has 
established no model or standard database and that no model or 
standard process for field investigations exist, including no protocols 
for mass grave exhumations or reconstruction of events, and no large-
scale interviews of victims and witnesses.  
The Commission had established all of that, and while it surely 
could have been improved, it was simply overlooked and nothing of 
any systematic nature was ever done. One explanation, of course, is 
that the lack of existing systems and processes, as well as 
standardized methods of operation, are certain to delay the work of 
any fact-finding body or individual, except when there is a political 
will to give such fact-finding greater momentum. In these cases, 
interested governments provide the resources, the evidence, and 
contribute personnel. Thus, fact-finding is held hostage to the 
political will of major governments. The means to accomplish that 
end are financial and bureaucratic. The absence of systems, 
procedures, methods of operation, and funding all contribute not only 
to delay, but to the inability to achieve the purposes of justice-related 
fact-finding. 
One of the fundamental struggles of civilization is to put an end to 
these crimes. One way of accomplishing this is to put an end to 
impunity. But to do so we must ensure that the processes of 
discovering truth and achieving justice, albeit relative, is not 
politically compromised as to its impartiality, fairness, and 
effectiveness. Suffice it to recall that the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia was recently reinstated by the General Assembly, 
ignoring that its new government formally announced that it regarded 
the ICTY as illegitimate and that it would not surrender its indicted 
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criminals, particularly its former head of state Slobodan Milosevic.  
Regrettably, we are still at the stage of historical development 
where these processes have not, except in a few cases, been free from 
the compromising encumbrances of realpolitik.31 In some cases we 
have only a façade, or “Potemkin justice”—props that look as good 
from the outside as Hollywood stage sets. However, in some cases 
we have made substantive progress and significant inroads, such as 
what the ICTY and ICTR have now accomplished. In these cases, we 
must acknowledge the accomplishments while we seek to correct the 
weaknesses. International justice, like national justice, can never be 
held to the standards of perfection. Our expectations should not be to 
seek the best, for it is frequently the enemy of the good. 
There is no better conclusion than the following: 
If you see a wrong right it; 
With your hand if you can, or 
With your words, or 
With your stare, or 
In your heart, and that is the weakest of faith. 
—Prophet Mohamed, from a Hadith 
If you want peace, work for justice. 
—Pope Paul VI 
The world rests on three pillars: on truth, on 
justice, and on peace. 
—The Talmud 
The three are really one, if justice is realized, 
truth is vindicated and peace results. 
—A Talmudic commentary 
 
 
 31, See, e.g., Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 30; Bassiouni, Searching for 
Justice, supra note 30. 
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